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I. Conceptual Framework 
I 1. Democracy and International Relations: Gradualism and Transformationalism 
The questions whether international institutions are in need of legitimacy and democratization 
and how to eventually conceive such democratization emerge as central questions in 
contemporary world politics1. Comparative pragmatic analysis leads some authors to the 
conclusion that most reproaches of “democratic deficit” in international politics are 
unwarranted or should be launched against the undemocratic member states, not against the 
intergovernmental organizations as such. This point is convincing in some aspects.2 However, 
it does not sufficiently take into account that, within the international realm, multilateral 
organizations represent specific political orders or coordinated and interdependent executive 
government based on generalized principles of conduct.3 As such, multilateral organizations 
face specific legitimacy problems. To the extent that this post-national form of government 
relies on conflicting values and creates externalities that affect domains of national popular 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Dahl 1999; Zürn 2000; Marks 2001; Keohane/Nye 2001; Keohane/Nye 2001a; Stein 2001; Cheneval 
2002; Moravscik 2005: 212; Woods 2001; 2003; 2005; 2006. 
2
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3
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sovereignty, the question how the citizens and the demoi participate in this realm of politics 
becomes pressing, especially if national democracy and political autonomy of small and 
medium size states is to be preserved.4  
The question of democratization of multilateral spheres of government can be 
understood according to a gradualist or a transformationalist conception. The gradualist 
conception designates a quasi identical reproduction of the normative structure of national 
democracy at ever higher levels, ultimately the global level.5 The transformationalist 
conception implies structural change with every step of vertical democratization beyond the 
nation-state. In this process, neither the composing units nor the overarching unit of 
government are assumed to simply reproduce the structure of nation-state democracy and 
nation-state legitimacy.6 
 
Although complicated on the operational level of politics, the gradualist conception is 
theoretically less challenging than the transformationalist conception. It simply applies the 
theoretical elements of national democracy to supranational democracy. This apparent 
simplicity, however, conceals a basic normative problem. The structural reproduction of 
democracy on the supranational level implies the dissolution of the national unit of popular 
sovereignty and its reproduction on the level of the overarching unit (definite delegation of 
competence-competence of the People to the new overarching People and its member 
Peoples). 
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In most democratic countries, even in many EU member states, there is considerable national-
democratic resistance against gradualist vertical democratization and delegation of sovereignty 
functions to supranational units. In normative theory, the debate about gradualist vertical 
democratization focuses on the reproducibility of “the People” on the supranational level. The 
denial of the possibility of such political engineering and a conception of “the People” tied to 
history, tradition, and cultural community are the reasons why some of the most pertinent 
arguments against gradualist vertical democratization can claim to be genuinely democratic.7 
 
I consider the gradualist approach as less plausible than the transformationalist approach. The 
transposition of democracy from the city-state to the nation state implied a transformation 
from direct participatory democracy to representative democracy alongside with considerable 
horizontal and vertical institutional differentiation. Even if one does not agree on the content 
of Dahl’s conception of the third democratic transformation8, the transposition of democracy 
from the nation state to the multilateral realm implies most certainly a strong 
transformationalist element. In the second book of his Politics, already Aristotle has held 
against Plato that the polity is composed of elements with which it cannot be identified but 
which determine its structure as composites. According to Aristotle, one cannot, as does Plato, 
conceive of the polity as a human individual (soul) writ large. It is a composite of individuals, 
families, villages, etc.9 This holds true for multilateralism: The multilateral institution is 
composed of nation-states (all of which have different sub-national units of organization and 
particular civil society associations), but cannot simply be conceived as a nation-state writ 
large. The EU in its actual form, for instance, cannot be conceived as a nation-state writ large 
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 See Scharpf 1999; Grimm 1995; Kielmansegg 1996; Greven 2000. 
8
 See Dahl 1989:13-33. 311-321. 
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but has to be conceived as a complex composite among which the nation-states are the most 
important and determining elements. This structural difference between nation-state and 
multilateral institution does not mean that all principles of multilateral democracy have to be 
original and different from the ones applied in national democracy. Representative democracy 
in the nation-state in many historical manifestations also realized elements of city-state 
democracy. The plausible assumption therefore is that there is continuity and transformation 
when democracy is tentatively realized in the multilateral realm. The main point of the 
transformationalist approach for normative theory is that principles of multilateral democracy 
have to be justified by a freestanding theory which is acceptable to all participating demoi and 
citizens in a fair procedure. Multilateral democracy cannot be structured simply by applying 
principles of national democracy and national models of democracy to the multilateral realm. 
 
 
I 2. Abstract Conceptions and Counterfactual Hypotheses 
The justification of norms of legitimacy and democratic government of political organization 
as well as the evaluation of democracies relies on normative principles and on validity claims 
that are not directly deducible from facts (including factual consent or contract) and even less 
so from preferences about which there is deep political conflict. Factual consent or real 
contractual agreements are of course an important element of legitimacy, but as such they can 
be reached under unfair conditions and with illegitimate use of power and pressure. Therefore 
the structure of the procedure in which consent is reached is as important as the consent itself. 
Many illegitimate dictators have broad popular consent, but this consent is not reached in a 
fair procedure acceptable for all. Shared reasonable justification of basic political norms thus 
Preliminary draft: do not quote without permission 
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ultimately depends on a counterfactual thought experiment which tries to explore a common 
ground of acceptability when shared understanding on a less general and more “real” level of 
understanding breaks down, or when the real conditions of bargaining indicate unequal power 
relations so that the legitimating force of the agreement is highly questionable. This 
counterfactual exploration of reasonable acceptability of principles should not be confused 
with the invention of concrete political utopias. In the tradition of political thought, the 
thought experiment which explores the common ground of reasonable acceptability of 
political principles has been called the social contract. In this paper, I adopt the Rawlsian 
version of this tradition and I apply the analytical devices of “original position” and “veil of 
ignorance” to the problem of multilateral democratic integration. This will be explained in 
detail later. With a specially adapted use of these devices, I try to establish principles for a fair 
system of multilateral democracy. 
 
I 3. Democratic Multilateralism as a Specific Political Order 
Multilateral integration can be distinguished from domestic and international politics at large 
by the fact that it leads to coordination and cooperation among three or more sovereign states 
on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.10 On the institutional level, multilateral 
integration of states can be understood as the creation of interconnected structures of domestic, 
supranational and intergovernmental decision making procedures, regimes and 
organizations.11 In the case of functional regimes, such as the IMF, NPT, or the Ottawa-
Process of Banning of anti-personnel Landmines, the corresponding organization’s relatively 
simple institutional character derives from the necessities and preferences of the states with 
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 See Ruggie 1993: 8-14; Caporaso 1993. 
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 Cheneval 2005: 333-358.  
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regard to specific issues. The legitimacy of such regulatory, mostly single-issue agencies 
usually depends directly on a measurable output, such as the successful fight against 
international monetary crisis or inflation, the reduction of landmines or nuclear weapon heads, 
the reduction of poverty, the eradication of polio, etc. 
At the other end of the spectrum of multilateral integration there are complex 
organizations which link several issues and are rule-based. As issue-linkage increases, output 
legitimacy is harder to measure by expert opinion only, and the weighing of output results in a 
context of competing values depends on preferences and interests which have to be filtered 
through participatory political procedures. The institutional structure of agency is no longer 
adequate and the organization needs institutional features adequate to its polity-like character. 
This political process implies more delegation to and more institutional differentiation within 
the multilateral organizations, as well as more linkage of different functional processes in 
deliberation and decision making. 
The principles and rules of multilateral integration may be few and basic, such as the 
principle pacta sunt servanda of international law at large, the principle of reciprocity, the 
most-favored-nation principle of the GATT, GATS and TRIPS12, or the principle of 
indivisibility in a system of collective security (e.g. NATO’s “commitment clause”, 
Washington Treaty, Art. 5). They may also be more far reaching and depending on complex 
institutional arrangements, such as the principle of direct effect of EU law, or the principle of 
non-discrimination according to nationality with regard to residence and freedom of 
movement for citizens of the EU (Art. 12 EC), or the principle of representation of citizens on 
the supranational decision making level (Art. 19 EC). 
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 MFN principle requires a country to grant any trading partner the same extent of treatment in terms of 
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This paper aims to provide a general normative framework for complex multilateral 
integration with broader issue linkage and rule-based character. The decisive criterion for 
inclusion in the concept of multilateral integration in general is that a regime or organization 
has to be based on at least one generalized principle of conduct. This principle has to be 
enacted as an independent source of rule-making and operational guidance within that specific 
field of multilateral cooperation. The reliance on generalized principles of conduct is the 
foundation for a rule-based organization leading to generalized anticipation of expectations, 
thereby creating the necessary conditions for vertical democratization to become necessary. 
 
According to the ideal-type of multilateral integration so conceived, statepeoples carry out 
multilateral integration without forgoing their competence-competence. This feature keeps 
multilateral integration formally distinct from state-building in which sub-state institutions 
delegate and thereby loose there competence-competence, i.e. their veto power to basic 
constitutional changes. 
 
The use of the term “integration” indicates that the paper tries to focus on compound and 
incremental conceptions of legitimacy and democracy, including different degrees and phases. 
The latter depend on the different issues and implied issue-linkages of particular fields of 
multilateral cooperation. Although issue-linkage (and therefore politics, including the 
domestic levels) is becoming gradually more important in organizations such as the WTO, it is 
neither assumed nor rejected that the different realms of multilateral integration are supposed 
to converge into a single polity (even the EU is still divided into different tracks of integration 
according to functional differentiation) or even a global polity. Instead of the idea of an 
“Endzweck” of ever deeper cosmopolitan union, heavily charged with a deterministic 
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philosophy of history, the paper’s working hypothesis is the idea of a differentiated 
incrementalism of legitimacy and democracy in different forums of multilateral integration. 
 
 
I 4. The Concepts of Legitimacy and Democracy: the Formal Minimum 
Legitimacy and democracy are considered complementary but mutually irreducible concepts. I 
basically understand legitimacy as a procedural outcome of factual acceptance (by the ruled) 
and acceptability (in the sense of worthiness of acceptance according to universalizable 
principles). Legitimacy can therefore be defined as the acceptance of a political order by the 
members whereby the acceptance is established via procedures and under general conditions 
that are judged worthy of acceptance. The latter implies rule of law as one of its most 
important elements, but also other concepts, such as transparency, publicity, vertical and 
horizontal accountability, reciprocity, or diffuse reciprocity.13 
 
Rule of law is understood as the independence, primacy, and guarantee of a legal order which 
is based on fundamental rights. When there is rule of law, the law or common rules of conduct 
represent an independent source of regulation for governmental and societal action. They may 
only be changed according to procedures regulated by the law or within the framework of 
freedom indicated by law. Rule of law implies equal validity of the law for all and therefore a 
guarantee of procedural justice based on individual rights. Rule of law is therefore to be 
considered a necessary but not sufficient condition of democracy. 
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 For a brief explanation of „diffuse reciprocity“ see Caporaso 1993: 53-54 
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Democracy can only be considered as a complex and non-analytical concept. It is based on the 
regulative ideas of freedom and equality14 and includes a certain number of necessary, 
specific, and possibly conflicting conditions of realization.15 These conditions are not assumed 
to be the same for democracy among national demoi as they are for national democracy. The 
complex notion of democracy is consistent with the conception of a disaggregated, 
differentiated and incremental realization of democracy’s key elements in the multilateral 
realm.16 Furthermore, democracy is not considered as a comprehensive concept covering all 
the dimensions of legitimacy. Its most direct link to legitimacy is the concept of 
accountability. Some aspects of throughput and output legitimacy, however, depend on expert-
evaluated and expert-guided performance. Democracy may provide legitimacy in many cases, 
but in others performance and outcomes can only be reasonably exercised and judged in 
relative independence from democratic procedures. This is common in domestic democracy 
where some spheres of government, for instance the judiciary, central banking, or regulation 
of industrial and environmental security standards, etc., are delegated to expert bodies whose 
accountability is organized according to special rules. These rules often fall outside the normal 
electoral or direct democratic voting process. They are not, however, disconnected from the 
rule of law and not totally disconnected form the system of democratic accountability and 
publicity at large. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Dahl 1971; Przeworski 1999; Schumpeter 1942 
15
 As conditions of realization of national democracy I consider: fundamental rights, inclusion, participation, 
political competition, representation and responsiveness, accountability, transparency, effectiveness of 
government, rule of law. 
16
 See Zürn 2000. 
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I 5. State of the Problem 
Besides the philosophical literature on Rawls (1)17, the paper builds on substantial and vast 
work that has been done on the question of legitimacy and democracy in the EU (2)18 and the 
multilateral realm at large (3): 
(1) Rawlsian political philosophy has met with some important critiques. I follow the rejection 
of a large number of categorical critiques as found in the important literature on Rawls.19 More 
specifically, I also accept Rawls’ assessment that the critiques have not been able to put into 
question the usefulness of the original position as “public- and self-clarification” of the 
normative framework of political justice.20 An important critique has been raised by Ronald 
Dworkin who pointed out that the agreement reached in the original position is hypothetical, 
not binding, and of no further significance to the justification of coercion.21 To this, Rawls has 
answered that the original position offers a model of the fair conditions under which 
representatives, viewed as free and equal, reach an agreement. It also models acceptable 
restrictions on the reasons by which the parties may determine certain principles of political 
justice and eliminate others.22 Given these two aspects, the model enables any potential 
reason-giver to conjecture alone or together with others as to the best publicly acceptable 
reasons for certain political principles. The binding force and significance of this device is as 
good as the binding force and significance of any valid public justification. It does not have 
the binding force of law but instead offers an argument for the political justice of principles on 
which a law with binding force can be based. Rawls has conceded to Habermas that the 
hypothetical public- and self-clarification of principles has to be appropriated in real 
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 See Freeman 2003 
18
 For overviews see: Bellamy & Castiglione 2003; Lord & Magnette 2004; Follesdal&Hix 2005. 
19
 For a dense and illuminating discussion see Nussbaum 2003, 491-496. See also Beatty 1983 
20
 Rawls 2001, 17 
21
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deliberation.23 The point however is that in real deliberation the participants are constantly in 
search of an equilibrium between relatively fixed general judgments and particular judgments. 
Although no specified kind of judgment ever carries the full weight of public justification, the 
original position is a device reason givers refer to when justifying the most general and 
freestanding principles of political justice in real deliberation. It has a limited but 
indispensable function in the clarification of the most general principles of political justice. 
This moderation in scope and reservation regarding foundational claims also puts Michael 
Sandel’s objection into perspective according to which the original position suppresses 
morally relevant information and therefore does not carry the full weight of its deontological 
foundation.24 I accept that point. The original position as a device of political philosophy is not 
the transcendental point of view of a foundationalist enterprise. In my understanding, it only 
seeks to make principles explicit for the transition from a previously accepted frame of 
reference to a new and integrated form of political organization. Contingent and empirically 
precise determinations are indispensable in the search for reflective equilibrium and the 
deontological weight of the original position is not directly decisive in any concrete 
deliberation. But insofar as reason givers refer to the most general principles of their 
argument, the original position models the adequate normative frame of reference to make 
principles explicit that are inherent in what is already presupposed. Any additional morally 
sensitive information has to be put to the test of due reflection based on principles emanating 
from the original position and then referred back to lower levels of moral abstraction with 
which they might be in tension.25 The original position is an explicative normative device. It 
offers a model of public justification. It refers to hypothetical agreements with respect to 
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 See Habermas 1998, 51-59; Rawls 2005, 372-385 
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 Sandel 21998, 27 
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 Rawls 2001, 29-32 
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certain principles (propositions) among distinct persons with potentially conflicting interests 
about which they are left in uncertainty.26 
The proposal to merge the two Rawlsian original positions in the case of multilateral 
democracy offers a middle ground between what Amartya Sen has called the rival conceptions 
of grand universalism and national particularism.27 Multilateralism designates a limited realm 
of cooperation among a limited number of states. It is a misunderstanding to identify 
multilateral with global and to consider the national-global disjunction as a complete 
disjunction. My proposal is also structurally different from liberal democratic 
cosmopolitanism. The latter position entails the abstract presupposition of a global basic 
structure and an original position of world citizens or persons as such28, or seeks other 
justifications of global institutions.29 I follow Rawls’ position that the presupposition of such a 
basic structure is moral and not political. The methodological presuppositions of my project 
also include a rejection of the reproach of a “perpetuity assumption”, held against Rawls. 
Rawls’ principles of the liberal law of peoples do not prohibit peoples from merging their 
                                                 
26
 This does not amount to a reduction of the original position to one person. The cognitive element of reduced information 
should not be isolated from the rest of the process in which different real persons may perform the mental experiment of the 
original position and imagine a group of representatives whose level of information is hypothetically reduced. This reduction 
does not eliminate their status as distinct rational actors pursuing different interests. Plurality is therefore a necessary element 
of the thought experiment. The interests of the representatives do not become the same by the veil of ignorance, they only 
become equally uncertain. My critique refers to Sandel 21998, p. 122-32. Thomas Nagel (2005, p. 125) objects that no 
individual choice, even under uncertainty, is equivalent to a choice of a group. But although individual and collective choices 
do not have the same status, individuals can agree to the same propositions as groups and the agreement of a group can be 
reached by every individual giving his agreement separately. The elimination of the assignment of probabilities has nothing to 
do with the individuality of the representatives, but rather with the question of what “uncertainty” means. Uncertainty for 
Rawls means zero possibility of assigning probability (See Rawls 2001, p. 106-10). Not only do citizens not know their 
position in society, they do not know whether the society will be a middle class society or any other type of society. 
Probability considerations are therefore not possible. A situation in which they are does not represent fair conditions leading 
to fair outcomes. 
27
 See Sen 2002, p. 35-51. The solution here proposed differs form Sen’s idea to take into consideration the multiplicity of 
agencies in order to determine global justice. In a political theory this is neither possible nor feasible. My aim is restricted to 
the establishment of rules for the political background structure among liberal democracies. Furthermore, I do not subscribe to 
Sen’s proposal (p. 44-47) to replace the original position by the impartial spectator, at least not in the determination of the 
principles of the political background structure. Reciprocity is irreducible to utilitarian impartiality as long as we take the 
distinctions between persons and the standpoints of the persons involved in a conflict seriously. See Rawls 1971, p. 184-192. 
28
 See Beitz 21999, 129-76; 1983, 591-600; Pogge 1989, 240-280; 1994, 195-224; 2001, 246-53; Kuper 2000; Ackerman 
1983. 
29
 For a recent discussion of institutional cosmopolitanism and defense of a consociationalist approach to global governance 
see Moore 2006, 21-43. 
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institutions or redefining their boundaries in location or function if they so wish.30 But if they 
decide to do so, a new political order is constituted to which a special set of principles applies. 
In order to be acceptable to the constitutive political actors, these principles need to 
correspond to the complexity of relations among different peoples and citizens from different 
peoples and can neither be directly deduced from domestic political liberalism, the general law 
of peoples or a cosmopolitan original position of world citizens. Rawls’ law of peoples values 
peoples as self-governed bodies of citizens. Territories and formal sovereignty of states are 
thus valued to the extent that they enable the orderly and legitimate existence of liberal 
democratic peoples. In considering the fundamental interests of citizens and peoples together, 
this paper combines the liberal conception of the person with the political theory of self-
government based on the constitutional consent of individual citizens. While statespeople are 
static and organized on a territory, the liberal conception of the person implies that citizens 
have to be assumed to be potential migrants. Liberal peoples have to be assumed to grant the 
right to exit and a conditional right to entry. They share a common fate in the exchange of 
migrants. Citizens of liberal peoples share a common fate as potential migrants and mobile 
economic and social actors. The Rawlsian assumption that the basic structure of political 
liberalism is to be imagined as a closed social system is in contradiction with the priority of 
liberty and therefore suppressed.31 But the mutual opening up of liberal societies does not 
justify a total suppression of the representation of peoples in the original position in favour of 
a global cosmopolitan system of persons.32 It is more in tune with the accepted normative 
ground of political organization if construed step by step and filtered politically (i.e. through 
the democratic peoples’ fundamental interests). Individuals who democratically constitute 
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 See Buchanan 2000, 697-721; 2003, 231-33. 
31
 Rawls 1993, 12. See the criticism of this point by O’Neill 1997, 417. 
32
 For such an argument see Kuper 2000, 645-648. 
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peoples still ought to be represented collectively as peoples because as a political unity under 
popular sovereignty they form a fundamental realm of justice. But in a liberal theory of 
political justice, the opening up of societies also means that citizens have to be represented as 
potential migrants and transnational actors whose fundamental rights have to be weighed 
against the rights of peoples and of non-migrant citizens of liberal peoples. In the original 
position here proposed, the representatives of the citizens have to consider principles of 
political justice from the point of view of stable and migrating citizens respectively. The 
representatives of the peoples have to take these interests into consideration and weigh them 
against the fundamental interests of liberal peoples. The people-representatives’ agreements 
on the other hand have to be weighed against the fundamental interests of individual citizens, 
migrating or stable. The principles that the respective representatives of citizens and peoples 
could presumably agree upon in such an original position can be considered the basic 
principles of multilateral democracy. 
 
(2) In a national-democratic school of research, the EU scores poorly in the literature on the 
“democratic deficit”. The authors usually evaluate the EU in the gradualist paradigm and by 
comparing it to their own domestic tradition. Accordingly, they diagnose either a lack of 
majoritarian (Westminster) parliamentarism33, a lack of a pre-political “Volk”34, a lack of 
centralistic statehood and universal “citoyenneté”35, or a lack of direct democracy36. In the 
process of increased preoccupation with globalization, some authors changed the paradigm 
and compared the EU with the state of democracy in international relations at large. The EU 
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 See e.g. Lord & Beetham 2001. 
34
 See e.g. Kielmannsegg 1996, Grimm 1995. 
35
 See e.g. Manent 2006. 
36
 See e.g. Frey 1995. 
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started to score rather well as the most advanced structure of democratic government beyond 
the nation state.37 However, there is a large consensus among advocates of this position that 
the EU still lacks political mobilization of citizens on the EU level.38 For many, this is due to 
an irreducible difference between domestic politics and any multilateral arrangement.39 
Intermediate and different approaches have coexisted with the aforementioned tendencies. 
There is a developmental approach which emphasizes the constant and sustained 
democratization of the EU ever since its foundation.40 A structural approach, taking its cues 
from liberal intergovernmentalism rather than republicanism, diagnoses no real democratic 
deficit for the EU since the latter does not lack any essential feature of constitutional and 
democratic control of government as we know it from existing national democracies.41 On the 
other side, a republican approach has been looking for ways to base EU democracy on a 
constitutive rather than a liberal notion of citizenship, because the latter allegedly considers 
the (EU-) citizen simply as an addressee of rights and not as a constitutive element of the 
polity.42 
(3) In the case of international relations and multilateral organizations at large, the research on 
legitimacy and democracy has also been impressive in the past years.43 It has been directed to 
specific features of legitimacy and democracy, such as transparency, equitable state 
representation, or procedural fairness, leaving aside questions of the nature of the polity of 
multilateral organization or of popular government in the strict sense of the term.44 In the 
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 Weiler 1999; Cheneval 2004. 
38
 Schmitter 2000; Follesdal/Hix 2005. 
39
 Dahl 1999; Stein 2001. 
40
 Telò 1995. For the democratization of new member states and candidate countries see also Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmaier 2005. 
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 Moravcsik 2002; 2005. 
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center of these efforts are studies which try to establish a link between institutional 
differentiation and increased legitimacy in certain multilateral institutions.45 In substantial 
manner, the protection of property rights has been put forward as the essential deontological 
element of legitimacy of the WTO.46 Property rights are in deed important and should be 
guaranteed for all human persons in a wider system of human rights.47 But taken in isolation, 
intellectual property rights favour industrialized exporting countries. They are not located 
within the framework of increased liberalization but rather of increased authoritative 
regulation. While general market liberalization creates win-win situations which enable all 
states to compensate losers better than without liberalization (if they do so it is another 
question), intellectual property rights do not create such conditions of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
for all. They might thus undermine the welfare case for liberalization.48 Important work has 
also been done on the notion of binding sovereign consent as basis of legitimacy of the WTO 
and as surrogate for national-democratic legitimacy.49 The draw backs of this position are the 
package deals of multilateralism which limit the differentiation of the consent and undermine 
the legitimacy of such consent.50 The most promising work has been done in the analysis of 
legitimacy by judicial power in the WTO, especially of the Appellate Body. Most interesting 
is the relation that has been shown to exist between this kind of horizontal judicial 
accountability and increased stakeholder representation.51 But this incrementalism of 
stakeholder democracy by judicial means of due process or other forums52 does not 
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fundamentally alter the fact that stakeholder democracy and contestation via global networks 
is very remote from the citizens’ preferences.  
In sum, these research results reveal a common feature. They operate in the vacuum or 
at least under great uncertainty with regard to the adequate normative framework of legitimacy 
and democracy for multilateral integration as a distinct political order. There is no framework 
of evaluation of rules according to criteria that include and inter-relate fairness to outsiders 
and fairness to insiders with the responsibility and interests of statespeople. Moral and 
institutional cosmopolitanism does not provide such a framework53, because it imagines a 
world of world citizens and disregards the basic political rights of democratically organized 
statespeople. In cosmopolitanism, there are only insiders. This is too abstract a concept. It 
disregards the necessity of bounded and subsidiary government and ethical embeddings of 
such government. Given this vacuum, this paper tries to find a normative framework 
according to which the legitimacy and democratic features of multilateralism can be evaluated 
in their own right and by taking seriously the citizens as individual persons as well as their 
collective representation as statespeople. It can claim originality for its proposition to consider 
citizens and states as the two basic references of normative validity claims concerning 
multilateral integration. And it can claim originality for its application of an adapted Rawlsian 
analysis to the multilateral realm. 
 
 
I 6. Two Ideal-Types of Multilateral Order 
As formal framework of analysis, I distinguish two ideal-types of multilateral integration:  
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•  (1) multilateral democracy 
o (a) is a complex system of multilateral cooperation with a membership 
structure of democratic states only 
o (b) aims to establish adequate democratic decision making on all levels 
(including the multilateral level) 
 
• (2) liberal multilateralism 
o (a) mixed (democratic and non-democratic) structure of member-states 
o (b) commitment to certain principles which are also elements of liberal 
democracy (e.g. non-discrimination; economic freedom, property rights, rule of 
law) 
 
The further argument is developed in two phases. In a first phase, I try to establish the 
principles of the more ambitious multilateral democracy. In a second phase and beyond the 
scope of this present paper, I ask which parts of that framework can be extended to 
multilateral integration without compromising fundamental principles and in view of an 
incremental realization of legitimacy and democracy in the member states and the multilateral 
realm. 
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II. A Fair System of Democratic Multilateralism 
II 1. The Ideal-type of Multilateral Democracy 
Multilateral democratic integration combines multilateralism as coordination and cooperation 
of sovereign states according to generalized principles of conduct with a strict democracy 
condition of membership. Such a conception applies when liberal national democracies (a) 
delegate competencies to supranational and intergovernmental institutions but retain 
competence-competence and the right of exit, (b) restrict membership in the created 
institutions to states fulfilling certain far reaching conditions of rule of law and liberal 
democracy, and (c) strive to organize the supranational and intergovernmental institutions 
according to principles of liberal democracy. 
 
According to the transformationalist logic, a special set of normative principles of legitimacy 
and democracy applies to this basic political structure. Neither the principles of national 
democracy nor the principles of international law can be directly applied to this structure 
without taking into account its special nature as distinct political order. Principles from 
national democracy and international law may very well be included in the basic structure of 
multilateral democratic integration, but this has to happen in accordance with a normative 
framework specific to a multilateral democratic order and organization. 
 
 
Preliminary draft: do not quote without permission 
 20 
II 2. The “Original Position” (Rawls) of a Democratic Multilateral Order 
In a forthcoming paper54, I have argued that the normative references of multilateral 
democracy are citizens and democratically organized statespeople. Within the contractualist 
tradition, the main analytical device that serves to determine the principles of multilateral 
democratic integration is the idea of an “original position”. The fair terms of multilateral 
integration are conceived as agreed to by those who engage in it. In order for this agreement to 
be considered fair, it has to be reached under certain conditions. In particular, these conditions 
must situate the participants as free and equal and must not allow greater bargaining 
advantages to some than to others. No threat, force, coercion, and deception are reasonably 
allowed. Most importantly, information with regard to the position in the societal arrangement 
agreed upon has to be restricted counterfactually. These are basic conditions of the Rawlsian 
original position. However, I have modified the Rawlsian conception of the original position 
in accordance with the specific structure of multilateral democratic integration. The main idea 
of this modification is that citizens and statespeople are part of an integrated original position. 
This corresponds to the normative structure of multilateral democracy with citizens and 
democratic statespeople as irreducible normative elements.55 The principles of the multilateral 
democratic order have to be acceptable in the light of the fundamental interests of citizens and 
statespeople in an original position. 
 
II 3. Citizens and Statespeople as Participants of the Original Position 
There is an intensive debate going on between the cosmopolitan advocates of a strictly 
individualist normative conception of global justice and supranational democracy on the one 
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hand56 and a constructivist approach advocating peoples as the normative units of political 
construction beyond the nation state on the other hand.57 This dichotomy leads to normative 
settings in which either citizens or statespeople are the elementary normative units of 
reference (represented in the original position) of political organization beyond the nation 
state. However, multilateral democratic integration is carried out by liberal democratic peoples 
who are seeking to open up to each other by creating a system of transnational rights and a 
common institutional framework of government. If one reduces the normative framework of 
this arrangement to individual citizens, as in abstract cosmopolitanism, the fundamental 
interests of sovereign peoples who engage in the process will not be adequately accounted for 
and most likely violated by powerful states and social actors. Furthermore, the political 
feasibility of integration will suffer, because in multilateral integration individuals act 
collectively as statespeople. The mutual opening up of liberal societies and common vertical 
democratization does therefore not justify a total suppression of the normative units of peoples 
in favour of an abstract individualist system of human persons (cosmopolitanism). Vertical 
democratization has to be filtered politically, i.e. through the representation of democratic 
peoples’ fundamental interests. 
On the other hand: as multilateral democratic integration is carried out by liberal 
democratic peoples, it would amount to a simple denial of normative individualism if the 
individual citizens as normative units of reference would be disregarded in favour of the 
fundamental interests of peoples as such (classical internationalism). Vertical democratization 
of the multilateral realm emerging from liberal democracies has to envision the enhancement 
of rights, freedoms, and the well being of the citizens within the new space of multilateral 
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democratic integration. The rights and freedoms of citizens are not adequately accounted for 
by representing the peoples’ fundamental interests or individual basic human rights only. In 
the system of multilateral democratic integration citizens’ fundamental interests have to be 
accounted for from a twofold perspective: 1. As sedentary citizens of a specific people holding 
all the political and social rights granted by their national democracy. 2. As migrant citizens 
within the system. As such they are potentially loosing some rights of their country of origin 
and potentially gaining new rights in the host country. In sum, in multilateral democratic 
integration, liberal democratic peoples, citizens of liberal democratic peoples, and intra-
systemic migrant citizens have to be considered the normative units of reference of a 
framework of political justice and democracy along side with democratically constituted 
peoples. I therefore propose a modification of Rawlsian and cosmopolitan methodology. The 
point is that the liberal conception of a fair system of cooperation and non-domination among 
democratic peoples calls for an integrated “original position” of representatives of liberal 
democratic peoples and of citizens of the peoples involved in the process. 
 
 
II 4. The Veil of Ignorance 
The original position58 is a hypothetical bargaining situation in which rational representatives 
defending their fundamental interests consider themselves as free and equal. The veil of 
ignorance restricts the information of the representatives with regard to their own 
identification. The original position contains a finite group of citizen- and people-
representatives with distinct traits that are theoretically defined. In this original position there 
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are as many possible worlds as there are possible combinations of types of participants and 
traits. The veil of ignorance does not change this, it does not multiply the possible worlds, nor 
does it change the general knowledge the participants have of all the possible worlds within 
the original position. It rather changes the knowledge the participants have about their actual 
position or any of their future positions. It is therefore also important to presuppose a plurality 
of participants with conflicting interests. The veil of ignorance does not reduce the participants 
to one, nor does it multiply the possible worlds.59 The main reason to adopt the device of a 
“thick”60 veil of ignorance in the original position of multilateral democratic integration is to 
avoid the danger that bargaining advantages will distort the finding of just principles.61 The 
original position and the veil of ignorance are analytical tools in which information is crucial. 
Ways to ensure fair bargaining other than the veil of ignorance, such as simple prohibitions to 
force principles upon others which they do not accept (e.g. the unanimity principle)62 are 
insufficient for the analytical task of defining principles. They give us no criterion to identify 
just or unjust positions and only ensure that nothing is accepted against anybody’s will. But, as 
already Étienne de la Boétie knew63, what is factually accepted can be unjust, even when 
implemented without coercion. It has also been shown that the unanimity rule provides 
strategic incentives to conceal private information.64 Given a situation of possible dissent 
under the unanimity rule, information would be restricted in way that possibly distorts the 
finding of fair principles. In short, the unanimity rule cannot replace the veil of ignorance in 
the task of finding principles of justice. 
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In the setting of multilateral democratic integration, the domestic liberal-democratic 
structures and the liberal law of peoples are presupposed. The representatives of the original 
position of multilateral democratic integration only establish the special principles relevant to 
this particular form of political organization. Therefore, additional information relevant to this 
bargaining process has to be available and some information relevant to bargaining advantages 
has to be withheld. The following conditions are needed to establish the relevant levels of 
information: (1) In the domestic original position, citizens do not know the social positions, 
comprehensive doctrines, race, ethnic group, sex, and native endowments of the persons they 
represent, but they know that these differences exist. These restrictions also apply in the 
original position of multilateral democratic integration. (2) In the original position of 
multilateral democratic integration, the citizen representatives know that they represent 
citizens from different liberal democratic countries with different constitutional arrangements 
within the range of liberal democracy. (3) In the original position of the law of peoples, people 
representatives do not know which branch of government they belong to, if at all, they do not 
know the size of the territory, the population, the relative strength, the extent of natural 
resources, or the level of economic development of their statespeople.65 These restrictions also 
apply in the original position of multilateral democratic integration. (4) In the original position 
of multilateral democratic integration, the people representatives know that in their societies 
favourable conditions apply that make liberal democracy possible. The point of view of the 
people representatives is thus rather similar to the law of peoples. (5) The additional 
restrictions of information that apply in the original position of multilateral democratic 
integration are that the citizen representatives do not know their country of origin, nor do they 
know if they represent sedentary or migrating citizens within the system, but they do know 
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that this difference exists and they know its relevance. The state-representatives do not know 
which state they represent but they do know the social positions and fundamental interests of 
states involved in a process of multilateral democratic integration. 
 
The just principles of a system of multilateral democratic integration are thus formulated as 
principles on which representatives of peoples, citizens and migrant citizens would agree 
under the conditions of the original position and veil of ignorance. The idea is not to 
necessarily invent new principles, but to identify which principles known form national 
democracy and international relations specifically apply to multilateral democratic integration. 
 
 
II 5. Principles of a Multilateral Democratic Order 
The principles to be included in the list of basic principles of multilateral democracy have to 
apply to the multilateral order as such, i.e. as basic structure. They thus form the specific basis 
for the general institutional arrangement and most basic constitutional rules governing the 
multilateral order. Many fundamental principles are thus missing in the following analysis, (a) 
because they apply to the national democratic order, (b) because they are presupposed as 
accepted by the democratic statespeople independently of their entering into the multilateral 
order, (c) because they are not basic principles of the multilateral order as such, (d) because 
they form part of the international order also recognized by non-democratic (decent) societies. 
We thus only establish the principles that are specific to multilateral democracy as political 
order of government composed by democratic nation states. Basic acceptance of human rights 
and freedoms, universal representation, separation of powers and/or checks and balances, 
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vertical and horizontal accountability, rule of law, participatory rights of citizenship, 
recognition of minorities, etc. are thus not included in the list, but they form part of the 
“luggage” which the democratic statespeople bring to the negotiations of the basic order of 
multilateral democracy. In addition, it can be presupposed that the participating states of 
multilateral democracy honour all obligations of international law and recognize the primacy 
of international law. States which do not recognize these national democratic and international 
principles will not be admitted to or will not be willing to join the democratic multilateral 
order. The states that recognize them and want to be part of multilateral democracy will seek 
the most adequate institutional solution to honour these principles in the multilateral order. 
 
 
1. Principle of Popular Sovereignty Regarding Accession to the Multilateral Democratic 
Order and Change in the Basic Rules 
 
Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizens and statespeople representatives agree that 
accession to a specific democratic multilateral order is in the competence of the pouvoir 
constituant of the democratic statespeople. No statespeople ought to be forced into a 
democratic multilateral order by (a) the decision of its executive or legislative branch of 
government only, (b) by majority decision of a group of states, (c) by majority decision of 
citizens which are not members of the democratic state in question. 
 
Analysis: 
i) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, some governments and the 
parliamentary majorities supporting them might want to accede to a multilateral 
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institution in order to enhance executive power, or in order to lock policies into an 
intergovernmental realm of decision making less accountable to national parliamentary 
opposition, national courts, voters, domestic civil society, etc. 
ii) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, some governments and their 
citizens would be inclined to force less powerful states into the multilateral 
organization’s realm of governance. They would do this in order to impose certain 
regimes and laws on them, and possibly to benefit from their resources. In the absence 
of sovereign consent, powerful states can thus dominate multilateral orders and expand 
their realm of influence through the multilateral order. 
iii) Under conditions of the original position, citizen and statespeople representatives will 
find any decision to join a multilateral order unacceptable that is taken by only one 
branch of government. They will consider the decision to join and the partial 
delegation of the exercise of government authority beyond the realm of the 
statespeople as a decision that belongs to the statespeople as such. 
iv) Under the same conditions and thus not knowing which statespeople they belong to, 
citizen and statespeople representatives will perceive imposed membership in a 
specific multilateral order as an unacceptable form of domination. 
v) Given the conditions of the original position, citizens and statespeople representatives 
will agree that any adherence to the multilateral order concerns the constitutional order 
as such and is an act of sovereignty. The decision to join a multilateral order ought to 
reflect a broad reasonable consensus. The decision therefore ought to be submitted to 
broad and intensive national deliberation and to the collective decision of the citizens 
organized as people. As an act of sovereignty, accession to a specific multilateral order 
is in the competence of the pouvoir constituant. 
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vi) Follows that any substantive change of the basic rules and institutional design of the 
multilateral order by a new treaty ought to be submitted to the same domestic 
deliberation and decision making process of the pouvoir constituant. 
vii) Follows that the accession of new members ought to be submitted to the sovereign 
consent of the actual members of a democratic multilateral order. 
 
 
2. Principle of Indivisibility and Non-discrimination 
 
Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizen and people representatives agree on the 
principle of indivisibility and non-discrimination of members. Favours, benefits, rights, or 
duties that are granted to one state by another have to be granted to all. Rights, benefits, or 
duties granted by one state to the citizens or legal persons of another, ought to be extended to 
all. 
 
Analysis:  
i) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, states and citizens might want to 
maximise interests via preferential treatments, factionalism or other divide et impera 
strategies. 
ii) In the original position, citizens and statespeople representatives will agree on the 
principle of indivisibility and non-discrimination of states, citizens, and legal persons 
regarding all matters stipulated by the multilateral order. 
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3. Principle of Legitimate Constitutional Difference 
 
Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizen and people representatives agree on the 
principle of legitimate constitutional difference. All constitutional rules that are not specified 
by and do not violate a unanimously ratified multilateral treaty remain in the competence of 
the pouvoir constituant of the member states. The democratic multilateral order thus allows for 
the coexistence of different constitutional orders. 
 
Analysis: 
i) Under conditions of full information, representatives of powerful states and/or 
powerful individuals may tend to impose on others a constitutional model that is more 
familiar to them or serves their interests to the detriment of others. Powerful states and 
social actors more apt to control the centre of power would tend to impose a 
centralistic model of government on all states. 
ii) In the original position, people and citizen representatives will not find any national 
constitutional model acceptable which has not been approved and appropriated by the 
citizens of that specific political community. 
iii) In the original position, people and citizen representatives will accept such 
constitutional rules as necessarily common constitutional rules of the multilateral order 
which directly follow from the principles of reciprocal obligation and non-
discrimination. 
 
 
4. Principle of Freedom of Movement and Residence of all Citizens of Member Statespeople 
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Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizen and people representatives agree on a 
common principle of freedom of movement and residence of citizens of all member states 
within the borders of all member states of the multilateral democratic order. Restrictions to 
this principle are possible only under special circumstances, such as pandemics and natural 
disasters. The principle of mobility implies factor mobility as individuals are presumed to have 
the right to move physically but also with their goods, their capacity to provide services, their 
savings, etc. 
 
Analysis: 
i) Under conditions of reasonable complete information, citizens (and groups of citizens) 
and states will find numerous criteria of exclusion of individual, groups or classes of 
migrants for numerous reasons. Certain professional groups will want to protect their 
job market by general restrictions, but keep other job markets open in order to profit 
from cheaper labour. States will try to export unemployment and thus rely on other 
states’ liberal migration regimes, but they might try to restrict immigration. 
ii) In an original position of multilateral democracy, citizen representatives not knowing 
whether they will form part of those who want to migrate or of those who want to keep 
others from immigrating, they will prefer the general right to migrate as offering a 
richer set of options and a more advantageous regime of creating prosperity. 
iii) In the original position, people representatives will agree to this principle of free, but 
reciprocally guaranteed and multilaterally regulated mobility because of the more 
advantageous welfare effects it offers to all participating peoples. 
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5. Principle of Legitimate Restriction of Positive Linguistic Rights 
 
Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizen and people representatives agree on the right 
of the statespeople to restrict positive linguistic rights – such as the right to public education 
and information in a specific language – to the languages recognized in the constitutional 
order of the statespeople in question and/or its sub-units. 
 
Analysis:  
i) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, migrants might want to claim 
positive linguistic rights in their host country, such as public education for their 
children in their language of origin, or the right to government information and 
documentation in their language of origin. The resident citizens and the host people 
might be strongly inclined to reject this right out of fear of losing linguistic cohesion 
and, if migration is massive, they might feel that they have to defend their cultural 
identity essentially reproduced through the language. 
ii) Under conditions of the original position, citizens do not know whether they are 
migrants or sedentary citizens. People representatives do not know whether they 
represent a host country or a country of origin of migrants. Under such circumstances, 
no representative finds a linguistic arrangement acceptable which is conducive to the 
loss of linguistic cohesion of a participating statespeople. The restriction of positive 
linguistic rights of migrants is thus acceptable. Also the right to private education 
excluding the language of the host country can be denied, and the host countries’ or 
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sub-unit’s language can be imposed as one of the principal languages in which private 
education has to be offered. 
iii) The restriction of negative linguistic rights, i.e. the right to speak and communicate in 
a language with others, is not acceptable under conditions of the original position. 
 
 
6. Principle of Combined Citizen and Statespeople Representation in Secondary Multilateral 
Rule Making 
 
Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizen and people representatives agree on a 
combination of universal direct representation along side with statespeople representation for 
the secondary legislative process of multilateral democracy. This requires linking 
intergovernmental decision-making with parliamentary decision making on the multilateral 
level and restricting the competencies of this process to fields stipulated by treaties. 
 
Analysis: 
i) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, the executive branch of 
government will tend to keep the secondary rule making process on the multilateral 
level in the hands of the executives. 
ii) Under the same conditions, executive representatives of large statespeople will not be 
opposed to universal representation as their weight increases through this institution 
compared to a strict intergovernmental system favouring small statespeople. 
iii) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, citizens of large statespeople 
will prefer universal representation in a multilateral parliament. Citizens of smaller 
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statespeople will perceive this as a loss of influence and tend to prefer governmental 
representation. 
iv) In the original position, representatives of both citizens and statespeople will find it 
acceptable to have both universal and governmental representation and a procedural 
link between the two securing balanced decisions. There is a clear difference between 
the contractualist and the rational choice approach. In principal-agent or functional 
analysis, the European parliament is an outlier for which there is no rational function66, 
the contractualist model is able to give a reason for universal representation on the 
multilateral level. 
 
 
7. Principle of Common Jurisdiction 
 
Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizen and people representatives agree on the 
creation of a common realm of jurisdiction by a highest court which exercises judicial control 
over all aspects of the multilateral order as stipulated by the treaties and secondary laws 
established according to the above mentioned principles. 
 
Analysis: 
i) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, representatives of powerful 
statespeople will prefer diplomatic bargaining and dispute settlement to a rule and 
rights based system overseen by an independent judiciary. 
                                                 
66
 Moravcsik 1998: 376; Pollack 2003: n. 27, p 203f. 
Preliminary draft: do not quote without permission 
 34 
ii) Under the same conditions, representatives of small and weak states will prefer a rule 
and rights based system of law protecting them from the exercise of power of powerful 
states and powerful social actors. 
iii) Under the same conditions, citizens representing powerful social actors with a direct 
influence on their governments will prefer diplomatic bargaining and dispute 
settlement to a rule and rights based system of law. 
iv) Under the same conditions, citizens who cannot exercise direct pressure on their 
governments and who do not belong to powerful statespeople will prefer a rule and 
right based system overseen by an independent judiciary. They will perceive 
diplomatic bargaining and dispute settlement as an insufficient guarantee of the rule of 
law and will fear that their rights will not be respected. 
v) In the original position, citizen and people representatives agree on a rule and right 
based system of law overseen by an independent highest judiciary. Diplomatic 
bargaining and dispute settlement represent unacceptable disadvantages to less 
powerful citizens and statespeople. 
 
 
8. Principle of Social Cohesion 
 
Hypothesis: Behind the veil of ignorance, citizen and people representatives agree (a) that the 
principle realm of distributive justice is to be located at the political unit with the highest level 
of allegiance and trust of citizens; and (b) that the there needs to be a redistributive regime of 
social cohesion among the realms of distributive justice. 
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Analysis: 
i) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, citizens will challenge the status 
quo (= domestic realm as realm of distributive justice) and opt for an extension of the 
realm of redistributive justice to the multilateral order if this makes redistribution more 
sustainable and gives them higher individual net benefits (be it as recipients or as 
taxpayers). In a scenario of extension of the order of redistributive justice beyond 
national borders, citizens will anticipate trade-offs between the sustainability and the 
cost/benefit function. The trade-offs will change in relation to the wealth and stability 
of the order to which their own order is extended or restricted (social gerrymandering). 
Not all possible extensions to a wealthier multilateral realm of distributive justice will 
be beneficial for less advantaged citizens as the multilateral order might offer a lesser 
degree of redistribution. Not all possible extensions to the multilateral realm of 
distributive justice will be beneficial for advantaged citizens as this realm might 
impose higher costs (taxes) on them than the domestic status quo (or vice versa). 
ii) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, the citizens will know that the 
extension of the realm of distributive justice will most likely decrease the mutual trust 
among the citizens and the trust in a common redistributive system. Multilateral 
policies will thus tend towards a decrease rather than to an increase of redistributive 
measures, certainly for citizens living in a system with a high degree of redistribution 
or with relatively modest but reliable and efficient redistribution. 
iii) Under conditions of reasonably complete information, statespeople representatives will 
opt for a maximum of coordination with other domestic policies in the determination 
of redistributive policies, and thus for a maximum of autonomy. For people 
representatives, an extension of the system beyond domestic borders is only attractive 
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if the partner countries are wealthier and thus help expand the general welfare effect of 
the redistributive system. The extension is unattractive if the participants of the 
extended realm of redistribution are less wealthy or wealthier but perceived as less 
efficient. Among the multilateral partners, some will be trusted more than others. 
iv) In the original position, citizen and people representatives will thus agree on the 
principle that the realm of distributive justice ought to coincide with the realm of 
allegiance and trust of the citizens.  
v) Regarding the acceptable differences among the realms of distributive justice, the 
citizens and people representatives agree on the principle of social cohesion providing 
for investments into basic infrastructure of the least advantaged members of the 
multilateral order at the cost of the wealthier members. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Contemporary political theory is working on the basis of the national-global dichotomy.67 This 
paper tries to break through this false dichotomy by developing basic normative conditions for 
the democratic multilateral order as a distinct political order. The latter reacts to the challenges 
of globalization and of universal claims for justice with incremental, functionally 
differentiated, constitutionally and democratically based integration between democratic 
statespeople seeking to institutionalize a fair system of cooperation for citizens and 
statespeople. 
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